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mployee benefit plans have achieved signif- 
icant success and  growth,  as  documented in 
several recent studies.'  The number of  workers 
and dependents covered by such plans has grown 
dramatically  over  the  years,  as  have  the  types 
and amounts of  benefits provided to the average 
worker.  Employee  benefits  now  account  for  a 
sizable share of compensation, challenging direct 
wages and salaries in importance in some types 
of  employment.  Paying  wages  in  kind,  rather 
than in money, is a trend with no apparent end. 
What  explains  the  rising  popularity  of  em- 
ployee benefits? How  does this trend  affect the 
economy  through  its  impact  on  wage structure 
and  labor  mobility? This  article  explores  these 
and related questions, following a review of  de- 
velopments in employee benefit plans. 
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS OVER THE YEARS 
Nonmonetary payment is  obviously  nothing 
new; barter has a longer history than does money. 
~ut,  by  the  time  the  American  economy  had 
evolved to its industrialized state of 50 years ago, 
money wages had relegated wages in kind to fringe 
importance in  most occupations.  The major ex- 
ception was in agriculture,  where the employing 
IlFor example, see Employee Benefits, 1973 (Chamber of Commerce 
of the United States, 1974); Mitchell Meyer and Harland Fox, Profile 
of Employee Benefits  (The Conference Board, 1974); and  Walter W. 
Kolodrubetz,  "Employee  Benefit  Plans,  1972,"  Social  Security 
Bulletin. May  1974, pp,  15-21. 
farmer often provided his hired hands with board 
and room (a practice that prevails today). 
In  1948,  the Chamber of  Commerce of  the 
United States surveyed a cross section of Ameri- 
can industry in order to estimate the "nonwage" 
labor  costs  of  doing  business in  1947.  Among 
the findings: 
Wages  paid  for  time  worked  understate  the 
direct labor  costs  of  doing  business  by  a sig- 
nificant amount. There has been a tremendous 
growth  in  the  importance  of nonwage  labor 
costs in  the  past  twenty  years.  The  average 
nonwage  payments  of  the  companies  in  the 
national  survey  represent  an  addition  to the 
labor costs of doing business equal to 15.4 per 
cent of the total wage 
In its latest report on employee benefits, pub- 
lished some 26 years after the first in the series, 
the national Chamber calculates that benefit pay- 
ments add to labor costs by an average of  37.5 
per cent of  wages paid  for  time worked  in  the 
companies  it  surveyed.  About  14.6  percentage 
points of  this is  part of  payroll in  the form of 
wages paid for time off (paid vacations, holidays, 
rest periods); the remaining 22.9 percentage points 
is outside of payroll in the form of employer con- 
tributions for social insurance, company benefit 
plans, and miscellaneous employee benefits. This 
nonpayroll category is one-sixth of total compen- 
21The Hidden  Payroll  (Washington: Chamber of Commerce of the 
United States,  1949). p. 5. 
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sation, a  more comprehensive  measure of  true 
wages that includes nonpayroll benefits as well 
as payroll (Table 1). 
The national Chamber's estimates of employee 
benefit  payments in  the country  as  a  whole  in 
1973  closely  agree  with  those  calculated  from 
compensation statistics  for  the  private  nonfarm 
economy in  1972,  reported by  the U.SI  Bureau 
of  Labor Statistics  (Table 2).  Most  of  the dis- 
crepancy  between the  two  bottom-line  percent- 
ages  is  due  to  the  inclusion  of  coffee  breaks, 
etc., in the larger figure.  Were it available,  the 
1972  percentage  for  the  economy  as  a  whole 
would  be  somewhat  less  than  for  the  private 
3/Employee Benefits, 1973, p. 26. 
nonfarm economy,  since this category excludes 
government (Federal,  state,  and  local) employ- 
ment,  where supplements to wages and salaries 
are  estimated  to  be  slightly  less  than  average, 
and agricultural employment, where such benefits 
are estimated to be substantially less than average. 
Both tables show how benefits have grown as 
a percentage of compensation, indicating that ben- 
efits have been increasing faster than wages and 
salaries. While most types of benefits have grown 
in absolute terms along with wages and salaries, 
growth  in  relative  importance  is  concentrated 
largely in paid leave time, and in employer con- 
tributions  for  legally  required  social  insurance 
and for voluntary employee benefit plans. 
According to a study by the Conference Board, 
"time off  with pay has increased for all classes 
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insurance has been much in the news of late, and 
is  worthy  of  careful study.  Employer contribu- 
tions for social security are part of labor compen- 
sation, and the revenues do provide benefits for 
Americans.  But  the  character  of  these  benefits 
differs  somewhat  from  private employee  bene- 
fits, and they will not be considered further here. 
Employer contributions  to  private employee 
benefit  plans  more  than  tripled  between  1963 
and 1973, growing to $39.2 billion at an average 
annual  rate  of  12.4  per  cent.  By  coincidence, 
this rate of  growth exactly matched the average 
annual rate of increase of employer contributions 
to social insurance over that same decade, during 
which time wages and salaries grew at an 8.3 per 
cent average annual rate. 
The types of coverage under privately under- 
wriaen employee benefit plans differ widely. For 
example, in 1972, an estimated 70 per cent of all 
wage and salary workers were covered by hospi- 
talization  plans  written in  compliance  with  the 
law, but  fewer  than  one-third  were covered by 
plans paying major medical expenses. Less than 
of employees."  The major  current trends iden-  half of wage and salary workers in private indus- 
tified are (1) increases in the number of  paid hol-  try  have  retirement  benefit  plan  coverage,  and 
idays, (2)  increases in  the length of  paid  vaca-  only  14 Per cent are covered by  long-term dis- 
tions  for long-service employees,  (3) decreases  ability  benefit^.^ Of course, many workers with- 
in  service  requirements  for  vacations  of  given  out insurance coverage from their employers do 
lengths, including more liberal vacations for new  have  coverage  obtained  elsewhere.  In  the  case 
employees, (4) declining differences in paid vaca-  of  retirement  plans,  length-of-service  require- 
tions between office workers and plant workers,  ments  tend  to hold  down the  Percentage of  all 
(5) increases in time off for civic duties and per-  workers covered. 
sonal business,  and (6) increases in the propor-  Private pension plans, including deferred profit 
tion  of  companies  with  paid,  noninsured  sick  sharing,  account for nearly half of all employer 
leave (but no increase in the duration of nonin-  contributions to private benefit plans. The Con- 
sued sick pay  benefit^).^  ference  Board survey indicates that the propor- 
Employer  contributions  for social insurance  tion of companies with pension plans is increas- 
have grown tremendously in the past  generation  ing.  Trends toward provisions for earlier retire- 
(Table 3). Government employee retirement sys.  ment  with  more  liberalized  benefits are  noted. 
tems have increased rapidly, paralleling the trend  Benefits under some plans are still unrelated to 
in  the  private sector.  But the  largest and  most  earnings,  but  the  trend  would  appear to be to- 
rapidly growing component has  been social se-  ward the more common type of formula that in- 
'llrity  (OASDH1). This country's system of social 
pisurve  of  Current Business, U.S. Department of Commerce. July 
Issues, gable 1.10. 
4/Projile, pp. 37, 85-103.  6/Kolodnrbetz, p. 16. 
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U 940,  TI 967,  and  U 9T1 
Millions bf  dllan  (Per  Cent  "of Total)  *' 
cludes  final  average  salary  in  its  computation. 
The years-of-service requirements for qualifying 
for  pension coverage (vesting of  benefits) have 
been eased in many plans, and will soon be re- 
vised  in  many  more  in  order  to  comply  with 
new laws.' 
The other  half  of  employer contributions to 
employee  benefit plans goes almost completely 
for  insurance  of  one  kind  or another.  In  the 
health  insurance  category,  the  trend  is  toward 
more complete coverage of  expenses,  including 
new  coverages such  as  dental  care,  outpatient 
medical and  psychiatric care, and home nursing 
care.  Long-term disability insurance  has spread 
rapidly in the past few years, with a trend toward 
a reduction in service requirements for disability 
pensions, and an increase in benefit levels. Group 
life insurance continues to be  the most common 
employee  benefit plan, providing a benefit typ- 
ically  equal  to  twice  salary.  Rapidly  gaining 
favor as a death benefit is the spouse's  pension, 
which  provides for  income  maintenance in  the 
event the employee dies before retirement. 
A  relatively  small  share  of  total  employer 
contributions to employee benefit plans provides 
for severance pay, supplementary unemployment 
benefits,  and for supplements to employee sav- 
ings  in  company  thrift  plans.  This  small  share 
is partly due to the relatively low cost of  termi- 
nation  pay  allowances  compared  to  health  and 
7lProfile. pp. 47-64. 
pension plan expenses, and to the small percent- 
ages of  companies which have savings plans or 
provide private supplementary unemployment in- 
surance. But for particular employees, these ben- 
efits can be a large percentage of compensati~n.~ 
THE ECONOMICS OF  EMPLOYEE BENEFITS 
A worker's compensation obviously involves 
two parties: the employee and the employer. But 
each  such  employment  contract  both  reflects 
competitive forces  and  becomes a factor in  the 
determination of  labor market conditions. Thus, 
competition for workers tends to drive up money 
wages in companies that do not provide employee 
benefits.  The payment of  compensation in kind 
(in the form of  goods and services) also affects 
others elsewhere in the economy. It has an eco- 
nomic  impact  on  those  who  produce  and  sell 
employee benefit packages (e.g., insurance com- 
panies), and on those whose businesses are stim- 
ulated by  employee benefit payments (hospitals, 
vacation spots, etc.). Pension fund accumulations 
play an important role in capital markets. Every- 
one  is  affected  in  some  way  if  the  nature and 
growth of  employee benefits have consequences 
for income distribution and resource allocation in 
the economy as a whole.  Although these equity 
and efficiency implications of employee benefits 
are not fully explored here, their directions can be 
indicated by  economic analysis of  the employer 
Blibid, pp.  1-9. 
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and employee reasons for wanting benefit plans,  to younger or to older workers, to married or to 
and of  the resolution of  these forces in the labor  single workers, to men or to women, and so forth. 
market  .  This is not to say that the benefits would be dis- 
The Employer 
"Behavior in  one's  own self-interest" is the 
fundamental  axiom  of  microeconomic  analysis. 
In the theory of  the firm, a business is assumed 
to utilize factors of  production in such a way as 
to minimize the costs of  operating at any partic- 
ular level of output. This rule of thumbapplied 
to personnel  policies-can  be  refined  to  take 
account of  the fact that  people are very special 
factors  of  production.  Thus,  assuming  the  em- 
ployer tries to hire and perpetuate a labor force 
that gets the job done at minimum cost, how do 
employee  benefits  help  the  employer  achieve 
this obje~tive?~ 
Company  payments  for employee  benefits 
may  hold  down  labor  costs  in  several  ways. 
Compensation  partly  in  benefit  form  may  help 
promote the idea of the company family, thereby 
increasing productivity through greater employee 
loyalty  and  dedication  (less  absenteeism  and 
turnover,  more  cooperation,  etc.).  Such  bene- 
fits as "company subsidized" parking and eating 
facilities may help control work time better than 
if  employees are forced to satisfy such needs on 
their own.  The design of  some employee  bene- 
fits, such as vacation time and retirement credits, 
acts to reduce turnover because of the tie to se- 
niority, or length of company service. The design 
of  others can  help increase  turnover  where and 
when it may be desired, as in pension plans with 
provisions for early retirement. 
The employer also can design benefits to at- 
tract  certain  types  of  employees.  For example, 
a dairy farmer who needs two full-time employees 
plus some readily available occasional labor can 
attract  applications  from  couples  with  families 
by  offering  a large  home and  free milk as part 
compensation.  In  industrial  situations,  benefit 
packages can be made to appeal relatively more 
9lBevars Mabry, "The  Economics  of Fringe  Benefits," Industrial 
Relations, Vol. 12, No.  1, February 1973, pp. 95-106. 
criminatory in a legal sense, but only to observe 
that certain benefits may be valued more highly 
by certain groups. 
Employers  do  not  have  to  pay  employment 
taxes on compensation  paid  in  benefits.  This  is 
undoubtedly a primary reason for the growth of 
employee  benefits  as  a  form  of  compensation, 
discussed .more fully in a subsequent section on 
government influence. Finally, employee benefits 
can be  the least costly method for employers  to 
reward  employees  by  rank or experience, or to 
hide the true compensation levels of certain em- 
ployees  from  other  employees,  or  from  stock- 
holders, regulatory bodies, or taxpayers. 
The Employee 
The principle  of  self-interest  is  assumed  to 
guide  the  employee,  too.  Naturally,  a  worker 
wants to sell  his services for as  much compen- 
sation  as  possible,  subject  to the  usual qualifi- 
cation of "other things equal" ("working condi- 
tions"  is a convenient catch-all for many of these 
other things). Compensation includes, of course, 
the value that the worker places on benefits pro- 
vided by the employer.  Such payments in  kind, 
therefore, are earned just as surely as are money 
wages. The  Conference Board study observes that: 
A second major pattern concerns the employee's 
pocketbook. The 1963 to 1973 decade has clear- 
ly shown that employee benefits are looked upon 
as earned compensation and, as such, the em- 
ployee should not be required to pay any portion 
of the cost of these plans.'O 
This statement is somewhat misleading, how- 
ever, in  implying  that employees  are  better off 
if  employers  pay  the cost of  benefits.  Tax con- 
siderations aside, this is not the case.  Actually, 
employee benefits are earned compensation only 
to the extent that the employer does pay for them. 
It  is  important  to  remember  that  an  employee 
earns  a  particular  level  of  total  compensation, 
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so that the more of compensation paid in the form 
of  benefits,  the less  the  employee  receives  in 
money wages. Thus, even if  the employee were 
required  to  pay  the entire cost  of  his  benefits, 
his  money  wages  would  need  to  be  that  much 
higher.  After deductions  for these  benefits,  his 
remaining money wages would be just the same 
as if  he were not required to pay any portion of 
the cost. Since the bookkeeping makes little dif- 
ference in the usual case of  benefits which cover 
all employees, the trend toward noncontributory 
benefits is explained  best by  the tax advantages 
of  this alternative-advantages perceived by both 
employee and employer. 
The  idea  that employees earn  all  of  their 
compensation is not based on some philosophical 
notion, but on the economics of competitive mar- 
kets.  Employers,  who  want  to  minimize costs, 
compete  with  one another  for employees,  who 
sell their services  for as much as they can get. 
This  interaction  of  supply  and  demand  results 
in a market price of  labor, or level of  compen- 
sation, for any particular type of worker. If com- 
pensation  levels  are  market-determined,  it  fol- 
lows that the greater are employee benefits,  the 
lower are money wages. 
Would  an  employee  be  better  off  with  the 
option  of  receiving  all  of  his  compensation  in 
money  wages,  assuming  no  tax  advantages  of 
benefit  payments?  If  one  accepts  the  premise 
that each  individual should be allowed to make 
his own choices, the answer is yes. A neat proof 
in the theory of  consumer preference shows that 
a worker is at least as well off with the money, 
since he can still buy those benefits that he wants, 
or something  else that  he prefers." Yet,  while 
some  of  the  growth  in  employee  benefits  as  a 
share of  compensation  can be  attributed  to em- 
ployer  paternalism,  much  of  the  thrust  behind 
this trend has come from employees, often through 
their unions. 
IlISee,  for  example,  Richard  A. Leftwich,  The Price System  and 
Resource Allocation (5th ed.; Hinsdale, Ill.:  The Dryden Press, 1973). 
pp. 92-94. 
Professor  Mabry  believes that  union leaders 
like employee benefits: 
(a)  The  administration  of  such  programs  re- 
quires a  bureaucracy which  tends to 
strengthen the rationale of  union existence, 
membership dependency, and, hence, orga- 
nizational survival. 
(b)  Fringe  benefits  are much  less  visible  than 
[money]  wages, and as such, are less likely 
to undermine the power of the union by at- 
tracting  a  large  number of  job applicants. 
Also,  the  lower  visibility  of  benefits  per- 
mits  uniform  money  wages  among  firms 
within an industry, thereby lessening intra- 
union  rivalry  while  still  allowing  unequal 
compensation levels. l2 
Employee compensation is higher with benefits, 
he adds, because the supply of labor is less than 
it would be if all compensation were in the more 
visible money wage form, because of group pur- 
chasing  power  (lower  premiums)  of  insurance, 
and because of favorable tax treatment of bene- 
fits. Each of these alleged advantages to workers 
are scrutinized  following  a look  at  government 
influence on employee benefits. 
The Government 
A  principal  conclusion  of  the  recent  study 
of  employee benefits  by  The Conference  Board 
may be summarized this way: 
The.  .  .pattern  that  clearly  emerges  from  the 
Profile  study  is  that  government  intervention 
in  the  employee  benefit  packages  offered  by 
private  sector  employers  has  increased, rather 
than  decreased,  over  time.  Not  only  has  the 
government's  role increased, but it has changed 
its  basic  orientation  from  regulator  to social 
planner. 
Regardless of  which  trends  are  followed  by 
unions and corporate benefit staffs in the next 
ten  years, the government  is  now  almost  cer- 
tain  to become  a  major,  if  not  the  dominant, 
force in  the design  of  employee  benefit  pack- 
ages during that time.13 
In support of  this conclusion,  researchers Meyer 
and  Fox give ample evidence including official 
12/Closely follows Mabry, pp. 97-98. 
131Profile. p. 5. 
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designation of four Mondays as holidays,  legis- 
lation affecting pension and health insurance pro- 
visions,  and  Internal  Revenue Code regulations 
determining  just  what  benefits qualify  for  spe- 
cial tax treatment. 
The power to tax  is  power enough by  itself 
to permit centralized social planning.  By  taxing 
various  forms  of  compensation  unequally,  the 
government  can  encourage  the  development of 
certain types of  employee earnings (benefits) at 
the expense of  money  wages. Tax inducements 
(and  discouragements)  work  indirectly  through 
the  market  system  to  bring  about  change,  but 
their  effects  are  just  as  certain  as  those  from 
direct legislation.  For example,  a tax  code that 
subsidizes compensation  paid  in  the  form  of 
health  insurance  premiums  leads  to  the  wide- 
spread  adoption  of  such  plans  by  employers. 
Eventually, most American workers become cov- 
ered  by  health  insurance  whether  they  want  it 
or not.  This is  not  to attack the idea of  social 
planning  aimed  at  universal  coverage  against 
losses  of  income  due  to  death,  illness,  unem- 
ployment, etc. Rather, the intent here is to point 
out that it is an illusion to believe that the growth 
of  privately underwritten employee benefit plans 
is completely the result of  free choice in  a free 
enterprise economy. 
The strength of the Internal Revenue Service 
in shaping benefit packages is exemplified by the 
failure of  the "cafeteria" concept of employee 
benefits to catch on.  Under a cafeteria benefits 
system,  an employee is  allowed to choose from 
an  assortment of  compensation alternatives,  in- 
cluding money, of  equal cost to the employer.14 
This type of  package is rare, because the govem- 
ment refuses to grant favorable tax treatment to 
certain options. l5 
It  is  clear  that  government intervention  in 
compensation practices is largely responsible for 
14/See, for example, George W. Hettenhouse, "Costlbenefit analy- 
sis  of  executive  compensation,"  Harvard Business Review,  July- 
August  1970, pp.  114-24; also Donald H. Mehlig, "Compensation 
Planning--Cafeteria Style," Pension and Welfare News, April 1973, 
pp. 53-58. 
15/Profile, pp. 2-3. 
the rapid growth of employee benefits. It can be 
argued that this growth is a desirable objective. 
However,  not  all of the economic consequences 
of government intervention in  this area are sum- 
marized by the declining share of  money wages 
in  compensation.  Moreover,  not  all  of  the  tax 
advantages that employers and employees believe 
they get from benefits materialize once the labor 
market and  the economy adjust to the changes 
that are introduced by such compensation schemes. 
The  Labor Market and the Economy 
The  individual  employer-employee  analysis 
is inadequate for determining the effects of em- 
ployee benefits on the economy. The conclusions 
from  such "partial  equilibrium" analysis  are 
not,  in  general,  extendable  to aggregations  of 
business firms, workers, etc. Tracing the impact 
of  an  outside  shock,  such  as  tax  subsidies for 
employee benefits, through the economy can be 
tedious,  but a compact two-sector model of  the 
labor market can explain some of  the most  im- 
portant consequences. 
Suppose that competitive,economic conditions 
characterize the labor market, and that employers 
are divided into two groups: those who pay part 
of  compensation  in "free" benefits,  and  those 
who do not.  Assume first that there are no em- 
ployer or employee advantages to compensation 
paid in benefit form. Assume also that all workers 
want the goods and services (insurance, etc.) rep- 
resented by  the benefits, in at least the amounts 
provided,  but that these also may  be purchased 
on the free market. As indicated earlier, the result 
is straightforward: the equilibrium levels of com- 
pensation will be exactly the same for both types 
of  employer,  with the non-benefit group paying 
money wages higher by the value of the benefits. 
(Any difference in  compensation levels between 
the two employer groups would be a disequilib- 
rium.  The higher level  of  compensation  would 
attract more workers than needed; the lower, fewer 
workers, ultimately bringing about equality.) 
Under this first set of assumptions, the econ- 
omy is unaffected if  some employers pay part of 
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compensation in benefits. l6  Because the employ- 
ees  of  the  benefit-providing  institutions  would 
have bought the benefits on the free market any- 
way (by assumption), they lose nothing. But they 
do not gain anything either.  This conclusion of 
no economic impact holds even if employees dif- 
fer  in  their  preferences  for  benefit-type  goods 
and services, so long as there are enough workers 
who want benefits to fill all jobs providing bene- 
fits (or, put another way, so long as there are at 
least as  many jobs without benefits as there are 
workers who do not  want benefits). Free choice 
is  then  accomplished  partly  by  choosing one's 
employer. 
Why  would  any  employer choose  to  pro- 
vide employee benefits under these assumptions? 
Clearly,  with tax advantages assumed away, the 
administrative cost of  a benefits program would 
have  to  be offset  by  savings elsewhere,  or the 
practice  would  soon die out.  If  net  costs  were 
lower because of  benefit plans (due perhaps to 
productivity gains arising from a "we're  all in 
this together" spirit), the practice would spread 
to other firms on employer initiative.  At  some 
point,  however,  as  more  and  more  employers 
adopted employee benefit programs,  the supply 
of workers preferring such benefits to other goods 
and  services  might  dry  up.  Beyond  that  point, 
benefit-providing  employers  would  have  to  in- 
crease  money  wages to attract additional labor. 
This would increase their labor costs, of  course. 
Therefore,  benefit  programs  would  continue  to 
spread to other employers only until an equilib- 
rium was reached. In this equilibrium, individual 
employers would gain nothing from having bene- 
fit plans. What about employees and the economy? 
This is difficult to answer. On the one hand, if 
employee benefit plans really increase productiv- 
ity,  then  average  real  wages  would  be  higher. 
On the other hand, some of  this increase in real 
wages would be in forms (benefits) not preferred 
by  all employees. 
161Except for those effects arising from the administration of benefits 
by employers. 
Impetus for employers to provide employee 
benefits  may  come  from  the  employees,  even 
without supposed tax  or insurance premium ad- 
vantages.  Workers  may  want  the  employer  to 
look  after  their  interests.  A  company  program 
spares the  individual  the  problems of  choosing 
an  insurance  company,  a  proper  program,  and 
the extent of  his coverage. It  also relieves him 
of  the  trouble and  worry  associated  with  accu- 
mulating  funds  to  meet  periodic  premiums  on 
due  dates,  and  of  the  need  to  process  papers 
to establish his eligibility."  In other words, em- 
ployee benefit  plans save  the  worker time and 
effort. How does this factor influence the labor 
market under the competitive conditions assumed? 
If  the employee wants the service, it  is rea- 
sonable to believe that he  pays for  it, and  this 
is what happens in the absence of  any employer 
advantages from providing such plans. This out- 
come results in  lower apparent total compensa- 
tion in firms with benefits, because workers are 
willing to  work  for  less. for  such  employers.ls 
This  would  mean  that  money  wages would  not 
only be less (than in the no-benefit situation) by 
the value of the benefits, but also less by an addi- 
tional amount equal to the value employees place 
on  the  service  of  administering  these  benefits. 
(This latter  value may  be  greater  than  the cost 
of  benefit administration, in which case the em- 
ployer makes a "profit" on its employee bene- 
fits  program!) To the extent  that  benefits plans 
are the result of  such decisions, the economy is 
not  adversely  affected,  and  free  choice  is  pre- 
served. 
Another advantage claimed for employee bene- 
fit  plans  is  savings  through  group  purchase of 
insurance. To be sure, premiums per participant 
are lower in group plans. But competition in the 
labor market erases this savings for employees, 
in the following manner. Start with the supposed- 
ly  true  situation  that  workers  really  do "save 
17lRichard A. Lester, "Benefits as a Preferred Form of Compensa- 
tion," Southern  Economic  Journal,  Vol.  33,  No.  4, April  1967, 
p. 490. 
18/Total  compensation  really  remains  the  same,  since  the  service 
of providing benefits is a benefit itself. 
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money" in such plans.  If  that is  the case,  then 
compensation  levels  are  higher  in  employment 
where  benefit  plans  are  provided.  But,  this  is 
clearly  a disequilibrium;  employees and job ap- 
plicants will desert the lower-compensation,  non- 
benefit  employers,  and  offer  their  services  to 
benefit-providing employers. This has the market 
effect of  depressing money wages in benefit em- 
ployment,  and  increasing  them  in  non-benefit 
employment.  An  equilibrium  is  reached  only 
when  the savings'  advantage to benefit employ- 
ment has disappeared. 
Now,  remove  the  assumption  of  no tax  ad- 
vantages  to employee benefit  plans.  In the real 
world,  there  quite  clearly  are  such  tax  advan- 
tages.1°  First,  assume  the  tax  advantage  is  to 
the employee only. Does he really end up ahead 
with a compensation package partly in the form 
of  tax-free  benefits? He does not in the case of 
a perfectly competitive labor market. This is ob- 
viously analogous to the situation described pre- 
viously.  Any tax savings from benefits are per- 
ceived  by  labor,  and  the wage structure  adjusts 
to  a  new  equilibrium  that  eliminates  any  such 
advantage.  The  employee's  total  compensation 
with tax-free benefits remains the same as with- 
out them. 
Suppose all companies  pay  their  employees 
partly with tax-free benefits. Are workers better off 
then? Are their real, after-tax incomes higher? No, 
workers are not better off if production remains 
the same and the government spends as much as 
before. The same amount of  taxes must still be 
collected; unless this tax burden is shifted some- 
how to the owners of  capital, lower taxation of 
benefits-type compensation must be made up by 
higher taxation of money wages. 
Even though an employee's  total compensa- 
tion  may  be  unaffected  by  benefit  plans,  the 
employer's  labor  costs  may  be  reduced  by  the 
19ISee. for exam~le,  Thomas I. O'Regan,  Jr., "5Ol(c)(9)--Paying 
the Tax Collector,  Pension and WelfareNews, June 1973, pp. 46-48. 
Some of the tax advantage to employees is in the form of shifting tax 
burdens over time. This is particularly true of private pension plans. 
Taxes are not paid for contributions, but  are paid when benefits are 
received  during  retirement. They  are  then  generally  taxed at  lower 
marginal rates. 
government's subsidization (through favorable tax 
treatment)  of  certain  types  of  compensation  in 
kind. This will certainly encourage the adoption 
of employee benefit plans, as firms not enjoying 
the subsidy  are  at  a  competitive  disadvantage 
with those subsidized.  In  the adjustment phase, 
the effect  is  to shift  the  tax  burden  from busi- 
nesses with benefit plans to those without them. 
As  before,  the  tax  revenues  must  come  from 
somewhere.  When "tax-free" benefits  become 
nearly  universal,  the  competitive  advantage  is 
gone:  employers  are  no  better  off  in  the  new 
equilibrium.  Employees,  it  can  be  argued,  are 
worse off since their choices have been reduced. 
Suppose  that it really is true that companies 
with benefit programs compensate their workers 
better (pay more) than those without such plans. 
This would imply imperfections in the labor mar- 
ket (such as barriers to entry)  and  a consequent 
misallocation of resources. In particular, the bene- 
fit-plan  firms  would  be  employing  too  little 
labor because their compensation level was held 
artificially  high. Total output  would  be  less be- 
cause  of  these  losses  in  efficiency.  Since  real 
wages  are tied  to  production,  this  would  mean 
lower  average levels  of  real compensation  in 
the economy. 
The labor market is, in fact, replete with im- 
perfections.  Does this detract significantly from 
the conclusions of  the preceding analysis, which 
is  based  primarily  on  equilibrium  comparisons 
in  perfectly  competitive  markets? It does  not 
detract  from  the  principal  conclusion  that  em- 
ployee  benefit  programs  do  not  increase  total 
compensation  in  the  economy.  Indeed,  to the 
extent that employee benefits introduce addition- 
al imperfections,  total employment and compen- 
sation are probably decreased. While interference 
in imperfect markets can improve resource allo- 
cation, this hardly seems to be the case for em- 
ployee benefits, many of  which reduce mobility 
and  disguise  levels of  compensation. The exis- 
tence  and  persistence  of  imperfections  in  the 
labor  market  do require  a  softening,  however, 
of  the conclusion that employees receiving bene- 
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fits cannot  realize  a  net  gain  in  compensation. 
They  can,  but only at the expense of  those not 
receiving benefits, so long as imperfections shield 
the favored group from free market forces. 
Benefit plans account for a large and increas- 
ing  share  of  employee  compensation.  Legally 
required  employer  contributions  for  social  in- 
surance  have  grown  rapidly  in  the past decade 
and the growth of  private employee benefit plans 
has  been  equally  rapid.  To some  extent,  com- 
pany benefits programs have come about as a re- 
sult of free market, free choice interactions among 
employees and employers.  Much of  the increase 
in paid leisure time, for example, surely reflects 
the  desire  of  employees  to  be  paid  partly  with 
time rather than money. But to a large extent, the 
government's  subsidization  of  benefit  plans ex- 
plains their popularity in compensation packages. 
Economic analysis of the market consequences 
of  paying wages in kind rather than in money re- 
veals that levels of  total compensation are unaf- 
fected by  this practice if  competitive conditions 
prevail.  That  is,  workers enjoy  no net  savings 
from the tax free character of certain benefits, or 
from the lower premiums under group insurance. 
Tax advantages enjoyed by employers with bene- 
fit  plans are tax  disadvantages  to those without 
such plans, which ultimately leads to widespread 
coverage by employers, and no remaining advan- 
tage to anyone. Employee benefit plans can only 
increase  the  compensation  levels  of  particular 
groups of workers by interfering with competitive 
forces, and this translates into a loss to the econ- 
omy as a whole,  since resources will not be al- 
located efficiently. 
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